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Introduction  
Young people with tenuous relationships to schooling and education are an enduring 
problem for addressing social inclusion. To understand how educational failure is 
produced, we develop an appreciation of the influence of embodied imagination, the 
affective, and gesture towards embodied imagination as a form of intensive time that 
arrests possibilities of some kind of future imaginings. We contend that young people 
who ‘fail’ in educational terms do so for practical reasons: reasons that relate to 
relationships between class, gender, race, geography and experience. There are 
dimensions of this experience of ‘failure’ and cultural disengagement that can be read 
as youth resistance to governmental imperatives, modes of resistance that are 
conscious and unconscious expressions of some young people’s experiences of 
alienation.  
 
This chapter introduces Spinoza’s work on embodied imagination and Deleuze’s 
work on intensive time, and outlines how these ideas can be put to work to provide 
new insights for understanding just how critical feelings are to the production and 
disavowal of educational futures. The exclusion of students’ feelings from existing 
studies of widening participation is a way of further excluding and silencing students 
whose voices and experiences should be at the centre of this debate. In order to rectify 
this issue, we develop a framework that positions young people’s bodies, experiences, 
voices and emotions firmly at the centre of our theoretical work.  
 
The study 
The Imagining University Education project on which this chapter draws, focused on 
imaginings of university from young people who have difficult relationships to 
education and who live in communities in comparable LSES regions of Australia. 
These areas all had low rates of university participation. Two hundred and fifty young 
people, aged between 11 and 18, were interviewed for this national, Australian 
project. Sites comprised a range of urban, suburban and regional settings across five 
Australian states (Victoria, Tasmania, New South Wales, South Australia and 
Queensland). Selection was based on whether the site: had proportionately low rates 
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of undergraduate participation by persons aged 18-20 (Birrell, Healy, Edwards and 
Dobson 2008); was LSES (ABS 2013; Vinson 2007); rated highly on indicators of 
disadvantage health, community safety, economic factors and education (Vinson 
2007), had reported high rates of behavioural problems; and had school engagement 
problems as indicated by school nonattendance rates, rates of school non-completion 
to Year 12, and attendance and absenteeism intervention programmes (DECS 2010; 
NSWDET 2009; Stehlik 2006). We pause to note that, given the high correlation 
between disadvantage and school based behavioural problems (Harwood & Allan, 
2014) in our view, high rates of behavioural problems suggest a good deal about the 
disadvantages experienced in a place. In this sense we are taking a critical stance of 
such disordering practices, and are opposed to accepting the notion that people 
experiencing poverty are simply more ‘disordered’. 
Participants were recruited through youth sector and related agencies, with youth 
professionals often joining interviews. Across these sites young people were 
interviewed using semi-structured interviews in youth settings such as youth centres. 
Interviews featured questions specifically designed to work with imagination 
(Harwood et al. 2013), including asking participants to close their eyes and feel and 
imagine what a university would be like. Transcripts were transcribed and uploaded to 
QSR NVivo™ for thematic analysis. 
 
The Sensory Imagination 
In order to achieve at school or university, students need an initial sense that 
their participation in an educational environment is possible. Either implicitly or 
explicitly, they need to be able to imagine participating. Such an act of imagination is 
often a radical defiance of the dominant narratives that students have been told about 
their aptitude for learning. In order to think about the role that feelings and the 
imagination play in making further education a possibility for those excluded from 
schooling, we draw on Spinoza’s conceptualization of the imagination as initially 
embodied. Spinoza provides the framework for understanding how feelings provide 
raw ‘feeling’ material that is processed and negotiated through thought.  Spinoza 
contends that the materiality of sensation is part of our imagination, which is 
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grounded in the body. The materiality of imagination is sense and this arises from the 
relations between ideas and the bodies and places that are their objects. Mind and 
body are different attributes of the same substance. Our minds are the idea of our 
bodies (2001: 56-7). This method for thinking through the body affords power and 
agency to the human form. Spinoza employs the term ‘reason’ to refer to an 
analogous method of thought, a method that he contrasts to the human imagination. 
Imagination is our sensory experience of the world, an experience that is a kind of 
collective awareness, as our bodies are an extension of our contexts. 
Focusing on human relations, emotions and imagination, in his discussion of 
God (Ethics Part One, 2001: 16) and his account of the origin and nature of the affects 
(Ethics Part Three, 2001: 98), Spinoza articulates his method for considering 
corporeality though affect. Affects are a means of mapping and understanding the 
body and the mind: 
The affects … of hatred, anger, envy, considered in themselves, follow from 
the same necessity and virtue of nature as other individual things; they have 
therefore certain causes through which they are to be understood and certain 
properties which are just as worthy of being known as the properties of any 
other thing in the contemplation of which we delight. I shall, therefore, 
pursue the same method in considering the nature and strength of the affects 
and the power of the mind over them which I pursued in our previous 
discussion of God and the mind, and I shall consider human actions and 
appetites just as if I were considering lines, planes and bodies. (Ethics Part 
Three, 2001: 98) 
Spinoza employs the ideas of lines and planes, simple and complex bodies, as 
methods for theorizing human actions and desires. We need to cultivate an appetite 
for engaging with formal educational contexts in young people excluded from school. 
We need to cultivate appetites for thinking differently and becoming differently.  
Spinoza’s philosophy also supports the argument that human actions and desires are 
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powerful, real and affective aspects of bodies. The body and its emotions are one and 
the same. To understand the interactions of affect and imagination through the 
concepts of ‘lines, planes and bodies’ (2001: 98) is to undertake an earnest approach 
to mapping and theorizing elements of human life that had previously been treated as 
unfit for significant academic investigation (Gatens and Lloyd, 1999: 24). This 
method for considering affect and imagination affords reason, or analogical thought, 
the opportunity to access powerful and individually unique aspects of our existence: 
our feelings. 
Working with the premise that affect and imagination allow us to access 
unique aspects of our existence maintains a scholarly focus on bodily context. 
Relationships between bodies determine the emotions and passions to which one must 
actively respond. Spinoza articulates this crucial point in his construction of the 
imagination (Ethics Part One, 2001: 40, Gatens and Lloyd, 1999: 11-40). By 
considering embodied affect and imagination through definitions, axioms, 
demonstrations and corollaries, ‘reason’ is able to traverse the imagination. The 
interactions of human passions and imaginations come into view as reason traverses 
the imagination. The affections of the human body lay down a range of associational 
paths in thought. These associational paths arise from an individual’s patterns of 
experience. A variety of individual patterns exist in contrast to the unitary order of 
reason, as individual patterns are multiple and they arise in various forms. All 
idiosyncratic associational paths are the product of an individual’s engagement with 
the community, a process of engagement that occurs by virtue of a body’s existence. 
Bodies uniquely articulate their surroundings because they offer an idiosyncratic 
extension of their context. (Spinoza, Ethics Part Two: 63) 
In bringing a contemporary political focus to Spinoza's work, Gatens and 
Lloyd (1999) explore the powers accorded to embodied knowledges, or imagination. 
Through arguing for an ethics of community and collective awareness, they theorize 
the significance of Spinoza's conceptualization of the body as a unique extension of 
context.Gatens and Lloyd (1999: 25) lay the foundations for their argument through 
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 5 
the way Spinoza draws together his physics of emotions with the project of theorizing 
human bodies as both collections and as parts of collective entities. An initial point of 
intersection in Spinoza's Ethics (2001) between a physics of emotions and the project 
of theorizing human bodies as collective entities can be found in his argument relating 
to associational paths of thought. It is Spinoza’s contention that: 
Variations [of imaginative thought patterns] are not a product of the 
affections of individual bodies in isolation from others. Farming and military 
activity give rise to different associational paths that reflect different practices. 
(Gatens and Lloyd, 1999: 25) 
Similarly, belonging to different socio-economic and educational contexts 
gives rise to different associational paths surrounding education and learning and 
these both reflect and inspire different practices. One of the effects of Spinoza’s 
understanding of the mind and body as individually specific and culturally grounded 
is that an individual’s imaginative associations are always considered products of the 
shared affinities of human bodies. One’s imagination is, by definition, the product of 
one’s relationships with other bodies. Thus, one person's beliefs and actions directly 
limit or extend the actions and beliefs that other people associated with it can 
undertake. 
Shared affinities of human bodies produce an individual's imaginative 
associations; which are reinforcements of human beings’ mutual strivings for personal 
strength (conatus). This process of striving for personal realization, or the 
accumulation of personal strengths, involves forming larger associations between 
singular bodies. The patterns of association that arise from occupational habits (habits 
which are themselves the products of larger associations between singular bodies) and 
their resulting occupational dispositions feed into, or inform, different people’s 
imaginations, or ‘tempers of imagination’ (Gatens and Lloyd, 1999: 26). Every person 
possesses a temper of imagination, which is an individual combination of imagination 
and affect that predisposes their orientations. 
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Desire and conatus, the innate striving of all human beings, are very closely 
related. To be an individual, to exist as a 'finite mode' (2001: 1), is to be determined 
through the mediation of other finite modes. For example, every individual object, 
such as an animal, a car, an object, is a finite modification of substance, a finite mode. 
The construction and perception of new finite modes of being occurs through the 
process of relations between bodies: 
Since imagination is by definition the awareness of our own bodies 
together with others, this interaction between bodies (interaction required in 
order for desire and conatus to occur) essentially involves imagination … 
Our bodies are not just passively moved by external forces. They have their 
own momentum --- their own characteristic force for existing. But this is 
not something that individuals exert of their own power alone. For an 
individual to preserve itself in existence, as we have seen, is precisely for it 
to act and be acted upon in a multiplicity of ways. (Gatens and Lloyd, 1999: 
27) 
The way Spinoza defines ‘imagination’ as bodily awareness moves 
considering human corporeality into the core of human well-being.  His ideas about 
bodily affects and the way they work are contingent on his physics of bodies. The 
simplest bodies we can speak of are no more than imperceptible elements of things 
that join together in order to create perceptible objects. These simple bodies are 
defined in terms of motion and rest. Simple bodies are the ‘proper’ objects of the 
human mind, as the mind thinks what it is the idea of before it is able to think what it 
is not. Gatens and Lloyd (1999:15) further explain this idea through their suggestion 
that: “Minds, rather than being composed of minute bodies, are ‘ideas’ of bodies – 
corresponding modes of substance under the attribute of thought”. 
Spinoza’s work, and later, the work of Deleuze, develops this mapping of 
senses an empirical ethics. A key component to Spinoza’s ethics can be found in his 
argument that human beings experience both ‘active’ and ‘passive’ thought processes. 
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Active processes are products of our minds’ activity, as our mind imagines things that 
are not automatically presented to it and develops new ways of conceiving the world. 
In contrast to this process of active thought, ‘external’ forces effect passive thought-
processes, as our mind thinks of the objects or circumstances that are immediately 
presented to it. Transitions between active thought processes and passive thought 
processes play a crucial role in Spinoza’s understanding of personal ethics and the 
nature of individual freedom: possibilities for choice and for imagining otherwise: 
The mind’s capacity to gain freedom from the vicissitudes of 
passion is bound up with its capacity to represent itself, and hence to gain 
an understanding of, what is not actually presented to it as bodily 
modification – of what is absent or no longer existent (Gatens and Lloyd, 
1999: 16). 
For Spinoza, we are free when we are capable of ‘imagining otherwise’, when 
we can combine an awareness of our present with imaginings of other possible 
existences, of metaphysical forces that shape our worlds and of the passive roles that 
we can play in contributing to totalitarian ideals. For a child expelled from school, 
freedom might be the possibility to imagine a future in which tertiary education was 
interesting and engaging and, in which they belonged.  
Spinoza argues that through engaging with ‘active’ thought processes the 
mind is able to think what is not there. However, the process of thinking can never be 
a strictly solitary enterprise. We have already introduced Spinoza’s argument that the 
mind, by virtue of its composition, is only able to think of ‘what is not there’ because 
it is grounded in materiality, grounded in what is ‘there’, or immediately presented to 
it. Imagination and sensation are grounded in materiality, and these generative, 
germinal physical attributes give thought its collective nature. Spinoza’s description 
of the mind’s grounding in materiality is based upon his contention that bodies are 
complex entities, and that it is through complex bodily sensations that our minds 
perceive the nature of a great many bodies, as well as our own. To experience 
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personal sensation is also to have a collective awareness: 
“The human body is of a higher degree of complexity than other 
bodies, incorporating a greater number of subordinate unities; and this 
greater complexity makes it capable of acting and being acted upon in many 
ways at once.” (Gatens and Lloyd 1999:18) 
Sensation, memory, imagination, and inter-personal relationships are co-produced, 
then. In Difference and Repetition, Deleuze talks about intensive time, which opposes 
and precedes extensive time. Extensity refers to the actualized dimensions of a 
phenomenon: its height, its specific components. Intensive qualities cannot be simply 
reduced or divided without transforming their bearer entirely. Intensity governs the 
processes through which differences interact and shape the world: 
 "It is intensity which is immediately expressed in the basic spatio-
temporal dynamisms and determines an 'indistinct' differential relation in 
the Idea to incarnate itself in a distinct quality and a distinguished 
extensity" (245). 
Intensive time is passive, in the respect that it is the temporality produced with 
and for a given empirical assemblage.  
Spinoza theorizes memory as an embodied phenomenon: “our bodies retain 
traces of the changes brought about in them by the impinging of other bodies” 
(1999:18). Thus, one of the implications of Spinoza’s bodily physics is his argument 
that the human mind has the capacity to regard other bodies as present even when 
they no longer exist. This imaging of bodies that are not physically present is also 
described by Spinoza as a ‘bodily affect’, and these affects are a product of the 
embodied nature of the imagination that are brought about through the material 
residues of experiences that live on in our imagination. These material residues form 
traces of experiences past, and serve to provide points of departure and points of 
reference for future experiences. 
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Following on from his understanding of the imagination as an awareness of 
bodies at the same time as being aware of one’s own body, Spinoza suggests that his 
theory of affect has arisen from the way in which “ it may happen that we love or hate 
a thing without any cause for origin known to us, merely, as the phrase is, from 
sympathy or antipathy” (Spinoza 1997: E111, P xv p 10). In exploring the power of 
affect, Spinoza suggests that in order to apprehend something in thought, a person 
must have a previous imagining of the things ‘essence’. The sense of joy that a body 
often experiences is a result of the mind’s capacity to participate in the essence of 
those it loves, and the minds capacity to form strong emotional bonds within which 
individuals come to form part of a wider whole. Indeed, theorizing the relations 
between individuals and wider collectives constitutes a fundamental component of 
Spinoza’s work in ‘Ethics’ and ‘Tractus Theologico - Politics.’ (Spinoza 1632-1677) 
Spinoza sees human ‘passion’ as operating in conjunction with images, and as 
organized around images. He goes so far as to map the geographies of human 
passions, arguing that images ‘cluster’ around points of emotional intensity. Spinoza 
argues that organized patterns of affect and image can be re-worked through logical 
thought. Those interested in widening participation need to effect exactly such 
thought processes in those excluded from school. 
People will always strive to increase their powers and this process occurs 
through association with other bodies of similar dispositions. Furthering the polemic, 
Spinoza contends that bodies will instinctively distance themselves from affects that 
erode their powers. Thus, within Spinoza’s conceptual framework, the embodied 
mind operates through a logic of positive association, an “associative logic which 
could be just as appropriately described as a logic of emotion and especially a logic of 
desire, as it can be described a logic of imagination” (Gatens and Lloyd 1999: 26).  
In order to change established patterns of affect and image that surround 
negative experiences with educational institutions, one must challenge the 
appropriateness of the images (the ‘ideal student’) that lie at the core of the organized 
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patterns of affect. Political activism is the act of reimaging the university student. 
Through his belief that organized patterns of human passions are grounded in the 
personal structuring of image and affect, Spinoza imbues his analysis of the 
operations of the passions with highly practical and personally ethical dimensions. 
Confused ideas, feelings, changes: Deleuze’s Spinoza 
Spinoza says “By affect I understand affections of the body by which the body's 
power of acting is increased or diminished, aided or restrained, and at the same time, 
the ideas of these affections” (2001: 98). For Deleuze, and Deleuze and Guattari, 
‘affect’ refers to changes in bodily capacity. The body to which Deleuze refers is not 
necessarily human. It is a degree of power held within any given assemblage or 
‘mixture’. Affects extend or decrease the limits of what a ‘body’ – or a given 
assemblage or mixture – can do. An affect, then, is the margin of modulation effected 
by change in capacity: a material section in its own right that articulates an increase or 
decrease in a body’s capacity to act. 
  
For example: a student is repeatedly rejected at school, and feels like a failure. They 
are expelled and are glad to be free from the place that made them feel bad. They 
dislike institutions and get an apprenticeship. The mental image of the school impacts 
not only their present, but their imagining of the future and possible futures. Places of 
formal learning are embodied negatively. A similar ‘alteration of mixtures’, in which 
experience changes mental images and/or images change physical responses, was 
effected through our research. From our conversations with young people, we can 
suggest that a juxtaposition of university and schools was pedagogically effective in 
terms of disrupting the idea of university as a big school. 
 
In our interviews with the young people, the interviewer opened a discussion about 
what university was like and offered to answer questions they may have about 
university. One of the amazing things that were pedagogically effective in these 
discussions was when the interviewers offered direct comparisons between university 
and school. The interviewers did this simply by highlighting the difference between 
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the two in terms of: weeks of attendance per year (26 at university versus 40 at 
school); the number and flexibility of face-to-face teaching hours per week (12 at 
university versus 30 at school – so you can work and study); curriculum content 
(mandated school content versus studying within your chosen field at university, e.g. 
if you do not like mathematics you do not have to do it); disciplinary differences 
(learning and attendance is your responsibility, versus suspensions and expulsions at 
school); physical differences (campuses often have cafes, bars, post offices, shops, 
food halls; schools are private property but most Australian universities are public 
spaces so you can just walk in and check it out); and social differences (student 
unions, O-week parties, social calendars). In some cases this moved young people 
from disinterest to curiosity in terms of what universities can offer, and sometimes a 
resolution to attend. 
 
The use of juxtapositions via market differentiation campaigns may be an effective 
tactic when promoting universities to potential non-traditional students. Such 
marketing might create positive affective landscapes of higher education. The main 
aim of such marketing could, and should, be differentiating university from schools in 
a way that disrupts understandings of ‘university as a big school’ and makes pursuing 
educational futures at university an attractive and achievable option. We would call 
for those responsible for marketing the widening participation agenda to strongly 
consider marketing efforts that differentiate schoolteachers from university teaching. 
Finally, we recommend that universities recognise conversations with LSES and that 
educationally disengaged students are a crucial part of their widening participation 
work (Harwood 2014; Harwood et al. 2013). 
 
While on one level what we argue for here is a change in marketing, this is because 
we want to effect and increase in subjective capacity to imagine university education. 
We want to make an affectus. In Spinoza, Practical Philosophy Deleuze (1988: 49) 
articulates affectus as: “An increase or decrease of the power of acting, for the body 
and the mind alike.” He then expands this definition through arguing affectus is 
different from emotion. While emotion is the psychological striation of affect, the 
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way in which our experiences of change are captured by subjectivity, affectus is the 
virtuality and materiality of the increase or decrease effected in a body’s power of 
acting. Deleuze explains: 
  
“The affection refers to a state of the affected body and implies the presence 
of the affecting body, whereas the affectus refers to the passage [or 
movement] from one state to another, taking into account the correlative 
variation of the affecting bodies. Hence there is a difference in nature 
between the image affections or ideas and the feeling affect” (Deleuze 
1988: 49, parenthesis our own). 
  
Thus, affectus is the materiality of change: it is “the passage from one state to 
another” which occurs in relation to “affecting bodies”. The image affections -or 
ideas- to which Deleuze refers, are generated by a specific kind of movement. 
Increasing or decreasing one’s capacity to act is the modulation of affectus: the virtual 
and material change that prompts affection or the ‘feeling of affect’ in consciousness. 
Deleuze’s work on this process of change begins with his reading of Spinoza. 
  
In Spinoza: Practical Philosophy, Deleuze tells us: 
  
[t]he affections (affectio) are the modes [forms of life] themselves. The 
modes are the affections of substance [matter, the universal] or of its 
attributes  … These affections are not necessarily active, since they are 
explained by the nature of God as adequate cause, and God cannot be acted 
upon … At a second level, the affections designate that which happens to 
the mode, the modifications of the mode [affectus], the effects of other 
modes on it. These affections are therefore images or corporeal traces first 
of all … and their ideas involve both the nature of the affected body and 
that of the affecting external body. … [then, quoting Spinoza’s Ethics] ‘The 
affections of the human body whose ideas present external bodies as present 
in us we shall call images of things ... And when the mind regards bodies in 
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this way we shall say that it imagines (Deleuze, 1988: 48). 
  
This quote explains affection or feeling as a signifier of affectus; Deleuze is arguing 
that feelings mark embodied changes. This framework for thinking about the ways 
ideas and interactions create changes is very practical when looking to change how 
people feel about education and how they imaging their future. For Spinoza, 
substance is the stuff of which life is made. It is expressed in modes, which are 
changed (affected or ‘modulated’) by affections (affectio). Affectio are traces of 
interaction: residues of experience that live on in thought and in the body. They make 
affects. Aspects of human bodies; molecules, muscles, blood, bones, communicate 
with each other, exist in relation to each other, and in relating, form an assemblage, 
mixture or body. Moving beyond the body, contexts and relations between human 
bodies are equally as constitutive of corporeal capacity. 
 
Like Spinoza, then, Deleuze (2003) and Deleuze and Guattari (1987, 1996) explore 
ways of thinking the body as a changeable assemblage that is highly responsive to 
context. For Deleuze and Guattari, each body’s embodied mind is a performance of 
difference, the mind is the ‘idea’ of the body; human consciousness is a product of 
corporeality. Our subjectivity is the embodied accumulation of our actions. Every 
human mind is as different as its body. It is impossible to compare the individuality of 
each body: every person has “the individuality of a day, a season, a year, a life 
(regardless of its duration) — a climate, a wind, a fog, a swarm, a pack” (Deleuze and  
Guattari, 1987: 262). The relationship between Spinoza’s philosophy and Deleuze and 
Guattari’s idea of the body is evident in their (1987: 262) often cited contention that 
every body is “… a longitude and latitude, a set of speeds and slownesses between 
formed particles, a set of nonsubjectified affects”. Here, as in the passage from 
Spinoza’s Ethics quoted by Deleuze earlier, we are reminded that the body is an 
extension of substance, a variation of the two universal attributes of thought and 
extension. Human bodies are consistently re-making themselves through their actions: 
relations, interests, the contexts in which they live. This re-making can be understood 
as the images of education that bodies produce and consume, as these are 
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technologies of subjectivation and ways of learning about the world.  
  
After Spinoza, Deleuze believes the materiality of sensation is the part of our 
imagination grounded in our body. To feel or sense is to imagine. The materiality of 
imagination, feeling, is relations between ideas and the bodies that are their objects: 
different attributes of substance. In his discussion of God (2001: 16) and his account 
of the origin and nature of affects (2001: 98), Spinoza argues affect enables him to 
consider the constitution and power of emotions in terms of ontology. Emotions are a 
barometer of affectus and are one of the ways in which bodies speak. He says: 
  
“… affects … have therefore certain causes through which they are to be 
understood and certain properties which are just as worthy of being known 
as the properties of any other thing in the contemplation of which we 
delight”. (Spinoza, 2001: 98) 
  
In Spinoza’s work lines, planes, simple and complex bodies are methods for thinking 
about corporeality, feelings, actions and desires. He also employs this method to 
investigate the human mind. Embedded in this process of inquiry is the conviction 
that feelings and desires are powerful, affective aspects of bodies. Corporeality and 
emotion are the same attribute. They are shaped by the aesthetics of their encounters. 
By considering embodied affect and imagination as “lines, planes and bodies” 
(Spinoza, 2001: 98), reason is able to negotiate (make a road map of) the imagination, 
to understand the ways we make feelings. Processes of making feelings are mixtures, 
or ‘assemblages’ of bodies, places, times, events. 
  
Spinoza sees human passion as operating in conjunction with, and being organised 
around, images (Gatens and Lloyd, 1999). In constructing a relationship between 
human passions and sensory images, he acknowledges the aesthetic responsiveness of 
human subjects and opens space for thinking about how art and the aesthetics of daily 
life change what it is we are able to do. The aesthetics of everyday life choreograph 
connections and resistances to people, situations and events. Sensory images cluster 
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around points of emotional intensity (Gatens and Lloyd, 1999: 40). Organised patterns 
of affect and image can be reworked through thought that is driven by emotion 
(Gatens and Lloyd, 1999: 65). Research in the humanities and social sciences 
imagines bodies, societies and interactions in particular ways. Changing our 
imaginings through research, and researching to map such changes, are political acts 
grounded in the aesthetics of practical. One route such research might take is to map 
the politics of feeling; unpack how aesthetics teach through making assemblages we 
learn through feelings. 
  
Following on from an understanding of the imagination as an awareness of bodies 
(one’s own body in relation to others), Spinoza’s theory of affect suggests to 
comprehend something in thought, a person must have a previous emotional 
relationship to the subject (Gatens and Lloyd, 1999: 22, 79, 82) – a prejudice against 
it, or fondness for it, based on an initial imagining, or first feeling. It is a relationship 
to this essence that generates affection, such as a sense of hostility or anxiety that the 
expelled student might retain toward the educational institution. The emotion 
experienced by the student once expelled when thinking of returning to school or 
university might be anxiety. The affect of this would be the ex-student avoiding 
education in the future.  
  
Images, experiences and information, then, can change established patterns of 
thinking. One way it can do this is through affect and image. Methods that work with 
affect need to challenge the appropriateness of the images that lie at the core of 
organized structures of feeling that discourage low SES students from engaging with 
Higher Education. For example, many of the images used when marketing Higher 
Education in the U.K feature attractive middle class white young women enjoying life 
in a non-vocationally oriented way. One university sells an image of a blonde girl in a 
white frock reclining on a beach, looking fit and healthy and slender. Another has a 
blonde girl walking up some stairs in a short skirt, looking backwards and smiling, 
with the tagline “I got more than a degree”.  Yet another has an image of a white 
woman standing in a quadrangle and smiling up at a man. One of the most prestigious 
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universities in Britain sells its programs to women with an image of a carton of eggs 
and a tagline asking if they want to keep their eggs for later in life. Clearly, there is a 
social imaginary being created and mobilized, or what Lauren Berlant would call an 
intimate public, that speaks to the role of tertiary education in developing middle 
class, largely white, reproductive femininity. Part of the affective work of such 
landscapes of images is to exclude those who feel like they do not belong to the socio-
economic grouping pictured in the images – those who are not middle class, white, 
interested in reproducing, and so on.  
 
Thus, we feel that Higher Education institutions need to change community 
imaginings of the appropriate university student offer new images through which 
lower SES might imagine university as part of their future.  
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